ASEAN of Hope and APEC of Vanity

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12–17 minutes

Distance as a Lens Across North Africa

Between November 10 and November 18, 2026, I traveled across Morocco, moving from the Atlantic coast through inland plateaus and cedar forests to the edge of the Sahara desert. Starting in Casablanca and Rabat, the route wound through the medieval alleys of Fes, climbed into the mountain town of Ifrane, dropped through the Ziz Valley into Erfoud and the wind-shaped dunes of Merzouga, and continued past the earthen fortresses of Ouarzazate and Ait Benhaddou into Marrakech. Moving through those changing landscapes offered a practical lesson in how civilizations endure while empires rise and fade around them.

In Morocco, history does not sit behind museum glass; it lives in the daily rhythm of the streets. Amazigh mountain communities, Arab scholarly traditions, sub-Saharan caravan routes, and Mediterranean trade have met there for centuries, creating a culture that absorbs outside influences without losing its own character. Walking through the old quarters of Fes, a visitor sees the everyday warmth of folk Islam alongside institutions of deep historical roots, including the University of al-Qarawiyyin, founded in the ninth century by Fatima al-Fihri, a woman whose family had migrated from Kairouan in present-day Tunisia.

Spending ten days in that North African crossroads gave me an unexpected perspective on the news arriving from East and Southeast Asia. Each evening, reading updates on a phone screen far away from the daily rush of Tokyo commentary or Manila traffic, I watched two major diplomatic gatherings take shape. From November 15 through November 18, leaders from across the Indo-Pacific were meeting in my adopted home city of Manila for the forty-ninth ASEAN Summit and its related sessions, just as preparations wrapped up in southern China for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit opening in Shenzhen on November 18.

Following those two conferences from the edge of the Sahara stripped away routine diplomatic language and brought out a clear contrast in political character. North Africa teaches a traveler to tell the difference between rulers who rely on grand displays of power and communities that survive through patient negotiation, hospitality, and mutual trust. As events unfolded across those November days, Manila and Shenzhen seemed to represent those two very different ways of dealing with the world.

The Round Table in Manila

Having lived in Manila for more than twenty years, I have watched the Association of Southeast Asian Nations work up close, with all its slow consensus-building and occasional frustrations. Now made up of eleven member states following the full admission of Timor-Leste, ASEAN brings together countries that differ widely in political systems, religious traditions, and economic size. None of these nations holds the military power of a continental giant, and every member remembers the experience of colonial rule or Cold War proxy conflicts.

Out of that shared history, Southeast Asian nations built an institutional habit centered on consensus, international law, and what regional diplomats call ASEAN centrality. Instead of letting one dominant neighbor set the rules for everyone else, the group invites major outside powers to sit around a table shaped by smaller and mid-sized nations. When the forty-ninth summit opened in Manila in mid-November, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. welcomed a wide group of world leaders that included Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, United States President Donald Trump, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, Chinese Premier Li Qiang, and United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres.

What stood out in Manila was the steady, practical tone of the meetings. Neither the Philippines as host nor Japan as a close partner tried to push Southeast Asian governments into choosing sides between Washington and Beijing. Southeast Asian economies rely heavily on trade with China while looking to maritime law and security partnerships to protect their independence, so demanding an all-or-nothing loyalty pledge would break regional trust overnight.

Japan’s role in Manila showed how a major democratic economy can support regional stability without acting like a domineering power. Arriving on November 16, Prime Minister Takaichi co-chaired the Asia Zero Emission Community summit with President Marcos, moving forward with the AZEC 2.0 framework to connect clean energy transitions with realistic industrial growth and energy security across Asia. During the ASEAN-Japan Summit, leaders issued a joint statement on economic resilience that addressed unfair export restrictions on critical minerals, offering a shared response to supply-chain pressure without heated rhetoric.

Alongside trade and energy, Tokyo and ASEAN expanded cooperation through a new partnership on artificial intelligence safety and security, as well as ongoing Official Security Assistance that provides coastal patrol vessels and radar equipment to regional partners. Every part of that agenda aimed to strengthen the independence of individual Southeast Asian nations so that no outside power can pressure them one by one. In Manila, diplomacy worked like a round table among equals, built on shared rules and practical cooperation.

Protocol as Theater in Shenzhen

The mood changed sharply when leaders left Manila on November 18 and flew across the South China Sea to Shenzhen for the APEC summit, the first hosted by China since the Beijing meetings of 2014. On paper, APEC is an economic forum of twenty-one Pacific Rim economies created to reduce trade barriers, align standards, and encourage technical cooperation. In Shenzhen, however, Beijing turned a regional economic meeting into a staged display of rank and petty intimidation.

News reports from the Shenzhen airport showed a clear gap in how the host government welcomed arriving leaders. When Donald Trump landed on November 18, Chinese President Xi Jinping greeted him personally on the tarmac while military jets flew overhead in celebration. Russian President Vladimir Putin was met by Cai Qi, a top member of the Politburo Standing Committee, and the leaders of South Korea and Thailand were welcomed with music and flowers. When Prime Minister Takaichi arrived, Beijing sent only a Foreign Ministry protocol ambassador, with no music and no flowers.

That deliberate coldness continued once the summit sessions began. In the traditional leaders’ group photograph, Trump and Putin stood right next to Xi Jinping and his wife, Peng Liyuan, while Takaichi was placed in the back row. China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency at first left Takaichi’s arrival out of its Chinese-language reports even while publishing standard notices in English, and Beijing declined to hold a formal bilateral meeting with Tokyo, limiting contact between Xi and Takaichi to a brief handshake and photo before the welcome dinner.

Seeing a major country use airport greetings and seating arrangements as tools of spite feels less like the confidence of a great power and more like schoolyard bullying. Mature diplomacy recognizes that treating invited guests with courtesy reflects the dignity of the host rather than the weakness of the visitor. By turning basic hospitality into a weapon, Chinese officials revealed their own insecurity, showing how easily rigid politics slips into childish behavior when a neighbor refuses to give in.

Just as telling was the way Tokyo responded. Instead of answering Beijing’s cold treatment with angry walkouts or sharp insults, Takaichi and the Japanese delegation kept their composure, took an active part in the group discussions, and left the door open for talks under the longstanding framework of a mutually beneficial strategic relationship. Anyone watching from outside the hall could easily tell the difference between adult self-control and staged hostility.

The Specter of a New Yalta and Fabricated History

Behind the unequal treatment in Shenzhen sat a much larger political ambition, seen most clearly in the three-way meeting among Xi Jinping, Donald Trump, and Vladimir Putin on November 19. Across diplomatic circles in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington, observers quickly called the gathering a New Yalta. The phrase referred to the February 1945 conference in Crimea where Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin divided Europe and Asia into zones of influence behind closed doors, deciding the future of smaller countries without letting them into the room.

Watching three nuclear-armed leaders revive that old habit eighty-one years after the end of the Second World War feels deeply out of place in our own century. During the Shenzhen summit, South Korean officials felt they had to warn publicly that the meeting must not become a second Yalta where countries left outside the room end up on the menu. Their concern pointed to a plain truth: when big powers treat world order as a private deal among strongmen, every mid-sized and smaller nation faces the danger of having its security bargained away.

In Beijing’s case, this great-power posture rests on a deliberate rewriting of twentieth-century history. Throughout the autumn of 2026, Chinese diplomats and state media repeatedly pointed to China’s role as a victorious Allied nation in the Second World War to lecture Japan on postwar duties and deny the political standing of Taiwan. Looking at the actual timeline, however, exposes a basic contradiction in that story.

The People’s Republic of China did not exist when the Second World War ended in 1945; Mao Zedong declared its founding in October 1949, four full years after Imperial Japan surrendered. The government that fought alongside the Allies, endured years of devastating invasion, sent representatives to sign the Japanese Instrument of Surrender aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay in September 1945, and held China’s original permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council was the Republic of China, whose constitutional government moved to Taiwan in 1949 and remained in the United Nations until General Assembly Resolution 2758 transferred recognition in 1971.

By claiming credit for the wartime sacrifices and diplomatic standing of the Republic of China, Beijing pursues two political goals at once. First, it tries to erase Taiwan’s historical legitimacy and paint a thriving self-governing democracy as a breakaway province with no legal roots. Second, it tries to lock modern Japan permanently into the role of a defeated aggressor, labeling any discussion of Japanese self-defense as a return to 1930s militarism. Using distorted history eighty-one years after 1945 is neither dignified nor convincing; it is an exercise in national vanity meant to cover domestic worries behind patriotic myth.

Asymmetric Pressure and Domestic Echoes

One of the clearest contradictions during the Shenzhen summit was the contrast between Beijing’s polite treatment of Washington and its relentless pressure on Tokyo. Even though the United States Commerce Department had tightened export limits on advanced artificial intelligence chips shortly before the meeting, Chinese officials kept their objections to formal protests and gave Trump a lavish welcome. Japan, which maintains a pacifist constitution, poses no offensive threat to Chinese territory, and regularly states its wish for stable ties, took the full force of Beijing’s anger.

That double standard comes from cold calculation rather than consistent principle. Chinese leaders know that hitting back hard against Washington would endanger a fragile trade truce set to expire in January 2027 and hurt an already slowing Chinese economy. At the same time, Beijing hopes that flattering the American president while publicly snubbing the Japanese prime minister will plant doubt in Tokyo, encouraging fears that Washington might put a bilateral trade deal ahead of alliance loyalty.

Seeing how Beijing built its excuse to isolate Japan requires looking back to a parliamentary debate in Tokyo in November 2025. During a session of the House of Representatives Budget Committee on November 7, opposition lawmaker Katsuya Okada repeatedly pressed Prime Minister Takaichi on whether a Chinese naval blockade of Taiwan would count as a survival-threatening situation under Japan’s peace and security laws. Although ministry officials had prepared standard notes advising her to avoid hypothetical questions, Takaichi answered directly, noting that an armed blockade involving warships could indeed meet the legal standard for collective self-defense.

Nothing in that answer changed Japan’s longstanding defense policy or expressed hostility toward China; it stated a plain geographic and legal fact understood by security planners across the region. Even so, Beijing treated the remark as proof that Tokyo had crossed a forbidden line. The very next day, Chinese Consul General in Osaka Xue Jian posted a violent threat on social media declaring that a dirty neck thrust forward must be cut off without hesitation. Tokyo seriously considered expelling Xue as persona non grata before deciding that a tit-for-tat diplomatic clash would give Beijing the crisis it wanted.

What made the outside pressure worse was the way parts of Japan’s own political and media world echoed Beijing’s framing. Instead of standing up for basic democratic norms when a foreign diplomat threatened a sitting Japanese prime minister with beheading, partisan critics at home accused Takaichi of needlessly provoking China. Worse still, certain self-proclaimed progressive commentators and social media accounts turned to personal insults, mocking Takaichi’s diplomatic smile at international meetings through crude, sexist comparisons to nightclub hostesses. Watching people who claim to champion gender equality use misogynistic slurs to score political points showed how fast rigid partisanship wears away basic human decency, turning domestic critics into local amplifiers of foreign pressure.

Concentrated Power Beyond National Borders

Stepping back from the immediate tension between Tokyo and Beijing reveals a wider pattern running through modern politics and technology. The atmosphere in Shenzhen, where three powerful leaders met to discuss zones of influence while leaving smaller neighbors outside, follows the same logic as the unchecked concentration of corporate power in the digital economy. Whether in world politics or global tech markets, institutions built on shared rules are being tested by actors who prefer one-on-one leverage over common accountability.

Look at the political systems represented at the center of the Shenzhen table. Xi Jinping removed constitutional presidential term limits in 2018, gathering party, state, and military authority indefinitely in his own hands with no clear plan for succession. Vladimir Putin changed Russia’s constitution in 2020 to reset his presidential terms, extending his rule well into the 2030s while hollowing out independent courts and political opposition. Donald Trump works within an American constitutional republic that keeps term limits, independent courts, and competitive elections, yet his political instinct consistently favors personal deals between strong leaders over multilateral alliances.

A very similar impulse shapes the behavior of giant technology companies. When a few huge platforms control cloud computing, leading artificial intelligence models, digital advertising, and consumer apps, they naturally resist common rules designed to protect smaller competitors, publishers, and ordinary citizens. Like authoritarian governments dealing with smaller neighbors, dominant tech monopolies prefer negotiating one-on-one terms from a position of overwhelming size, knowing that isolated partners lack the leverage to demand fair treatment.

In both areas, the answer to concentrated power is the same. Smaller and mid-sized actors cannot match a giant in raw force, whether measured in warships, rare-earth processing plants, or server farms. Their strength comes from refusing to stand alone, building horizontal partnerships grounded in clear laws, and insisting that rules apply equally no matter how large a player may be.

Horizontal Solidarity in an Unsettled Century

Looking back across my days in Morocco alongside the diplomatic events in Manila and Shenzhen, the deeper pattern of our time becomes easier to see. Walking through the old medinas of Fes and Marrakech or watching the sun set behind the dunes of Merzouga reminds a traveler that empires obsessed with grand ceremonies and intimidation rarely outlast the everyday habits of ordinary communities. Dynasties built monuments to their own permanence across North Africa, yet what survived over the centuries were the networks of trade, learning, hospitality, and shared law that allowed diverse peoples to live side by side in relative peace.

Manila and Tokyo showed that same practical wisdom during the November meetings. Living in the Philippines, I felt real reassurance watching Southeast Asian leaders welcome Japan not as an overbearing patron, but as a steady partner committed to clean energy, reliable supply chains, and maritime law. Neither the Philippines nor Japan harbors imperial ambitions, and neither tries to lecture neighbors from a position of historical superiority. Both understand that in a tense region, national dignity is best protected by strengthening the shared resilience of friends.

Shenzhen offered the opposite lesson, showing how empty diplomacy becomes when it is driven by vanity. Staging military flyovers for favored guests while withholding flowers from a neighbor, rewriting twentieth-century history to claim wartime honors earned by another government, and dreaming of a new Yalta where three strongmen divide the world may satisfy domestic propaganda for a news cycle. Over time, however, that kind of behavior breeds distrust and speeds up the very regional cooperation it hopes to stop.

In an unsettled century where concentrated power repeatedly tempts leaders and corporations alike to trample shared rules, hope does not rest in the loud posturing of giants. It lives in the steady, horizontal solidarity of ordinary democracies and mid-sized nations gathering around an equal table, refusing to be bullied, and defending human dignity through patient cooperation.

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